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THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM:
STATE COMPETITION AND THE NEW
TREND TOWARD DE FACTO FEDERAL
MINIMUM STANDARDS
John C. Coffee, Jr.*

What sensible compromise can be struck between Bill Cary's and
Ralph Winter's views of the competition among states for corporate
charters? This is the relevant question to ask in response to Professor
Romano's stimulating paper, because if one ends in an intermediate
position between Cary and Winter (as she does and as I do), then one
needs to focus on the protections shareholders should be accorded
both to protect them from exploitation at the hands of a state pursuing tax revenues and from excessive regulation by a state whose regulatory efforts are intended in fact to realize ulterior objectives
unrelated to shareholder wealth maximization. In this response, I
will suggest one approach that attempts to update a reform proposed
by Bill Cary in his famous article on Federalism and Corporate Law, 1
but does so in order to accommodate the rival insights offered by
Ralph Winter. While I would not defend everything Bill Cary said in
his influential article, I find it ironic that in a quiet, low-visibility way
we are today witnessing the promulgation of new types of federal minimum standards that significantly regulate public corporations and
constrain state law. Although no political program is less likely to be
attained than federal chartering, Bill Cary's alternative-federal minimum standards-appears to be succeeding even as it is being ignored.
What evidence supports my very counterintuitive announcement
of victory for Bill Cary's vision? I have two distinct and significant
events in mind: First, last summer, the SEC adopted rule 14d-10, the
all holders rule, which bans tender offers that exclude some holders of
the class of securities sought. 2 In effect, this rule has trivialized an
important 1984 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Unocal·
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 3 which legitimized discriminatory self• Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., 1966, Amherst College; LLB., 1969, Yale Law School; LL.M., 1976, New York University.
1 Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663
(1974).
2 See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-6653, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1186 (July 16, 1986).
3 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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tenders as an antitakeover defense. Similarly, last summer the Seventh Circuit, in an important decision by the redoubtable Judge Posner, invalidated a "poison pill" plan adopted by CTS Corporation.
Although other decisions have also struck down poison pill plans,4
the distinctive element in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. 5
was Judge Posner's statement, arguably in dicta, that the plan would
be invalid even if authorized by Delaware corporate law because it
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce and was preempted by
the Williams Act. Going further than other recent decisions, CTS
also stated that even the time-honored "internal affairs" rule, which
makes dispositive the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation, would
not be respected where it interfered with the free operation of the
market for corporate control and this impact was "direct, intended,
and substantial." 6 This decision casts a serious cloud over the continuing force of an important recent Delaware decision, Moran v. Household International, Inc. 7 Hence, since last summer, we have seen the
certain downfall of Unocal and the possible eclipse of Moran by federal law.
Delaware is not the only state to have suffered this fate. A
number of other recent decisions have invalidated second generation
antitakeover statutes, 8 even though these statutes purport to apply
only to firms incorporated within the state's jurisdiction and, thus, do
not have any more extraterritorial effect than does a Delaware statute
that, for example, defines whether Delaware corporation shareholders
have preemptive rights or can commence a derivative suit without
making a demand on the board. The issue thus framed is significant:
If poison pills and certain supermajority voting provisions triggered
by a controlling shares acquisition are constitutionally invalid, what
about special appraisal rights or a simple majority voting approval
requirement for a partial bid? Are such provisions similarly invalid?
If so, the reach of Judge Posner's theory is intrusive indeed, and the
4 See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 92,857 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618
F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 92,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp.
468 (D.N.J. 1985).
s 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); see also Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 796 Fi2d 135 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 86-344 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986)
(Ohio statute making it easier for incumbent management to defend against takeover held
unconstitutional).
6 Id. at 264.
7 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
s See, e.g., Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986); APL Ltd. Partnership
v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
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stability of our two-tier system of corporate law may be seriously
challenged. The prospect is that the statement in Santa Fe Industries
v. Green 9 that "corporations are creatures of state law" 10 may be in
the process of being overshadowed by the statement in Flgar v.
MITE Corp. that the market for control may not be chilled oy state
regulation. 11 To report the death of Santa Fe is highly premature, but
it is timely to suggest that its health as a precedent has declined.
Here, at last, I come into serious contact with the themes discussed in Professor Romano's incisive paper. If one believes that multistate competition is value maximizing for shareholders, then it seems
to follow that the new constraints represented by rule 14d-10 and the
CTS decision should logically reduce shareholder wealth. From a
neoclassical perspective, "bad" state law decisions will, in time, be
reversed, because corporations would otherwise migrate from them.
That is, if cases such as Unocal and Moran were unwise, corporations
would simply reincorporate elsewhere, at least until the Delaware legislature-reversed these decisions. Of course, no such movement away
from Delaware is visible, since corporate managers were delighted
with Unocal and Moran. Does this mean that these decisions were
sound? At least among corporate scholars, they elicited a uniquely
broad condemnation. Perhaps, then, the theory has problems. As I
will ultimately suggest, the greatest problems may lie with who has
control over the reincorporation decision. Initially, however, a closer
examination of Professor Romano's reasoning is warranted. While I
next propose a different way to understand Delaware's current hegemony, I do not mean to reject Professor Romano's interpretation,
but rather to suggest that the data on which she relies are ambiguous
and can support quite different interpretations.
I.

INTERSTATE COMPETITION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FIXED
INVESTMENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL

Professor Romano characterizes all commentators, including
herself, as believing that states are principally seeking tax revenues
when they compete for corporate charters. This seems overstated. If
Delaware corporate franchise taxes were repealed or invalidated tomorrow, I believe little would change. My view is that the political
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 479.
l l 457 U.S. 624, 643-45 (1982) (noting that tender offers do not regulate the internal affairs
of a corporation and that a state has no legitimate claim to regulate market transactions between nonresident shareholders). I have criticized this firm/market distinction. See Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. I (1986).
9

10
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dynamics and interest-group politics are far more important than this
relatively crude form of economic determinism.
A.

The Political Context

A simple story begins as follows: Once Delaware obtained its
current oligopolistic position, powerful lobbies arose that had a strong
interest in maintaining Delaware's status as the preeminent authority
on corporate-law matters. Because any loss in Delaware's preeminence implied a loss of revenues for the legal profession there, that
state's highly specialized corporate bar organized to preserve its status
in order to protect its investment in transaction specific human capital. Lawyers are a powerful lobby, as the medical profession and the
insurance industry have recently learned in their largely unsuccessful
efforts to secure the "reform" of medical malpractice or products liability doctrines. Although in most states it is the trial bar that is the
most politically active, Delaware's success in the charter competition
implies that it has a uniquely high percentage of corporate lawyers.
Moreover, this group constitutes a sophisticated elite within the bar of
an otherwise small, agrarian state. I do not mean to decry this fact.
Lawyers are as much entitled to lobby for protection as are farmers
for subsidies or domestic manufacturers for high tariffs. But what is
best for lawyers is not always best for shareholders.
More generally, even without lobbying, it is predictable that any
state or political unit will seek to protect the interests of an important
constituency in the absence of countervailing pressures. Nor is it only
lawyers who are affected. Delaware's corporate preeminence supports
satellite industries. For example, Wilmington hotels are filled with
out-of-state litigators preparing to argue in the Chancery Court. Additionally, Delaware residents are employed by corporate service
firms, and in a host of other ways, Delaware's "gross state product" is
enhanced by this commerce, even apart from its effect on tax
revenues.
Another distinctive fact about Delaware as a jurisdiction is the
relative absence of countervailing lobbies. In California, which probably has the most "activist," least lax body of corporate law, the lawmaking process may involve a number of contending groups: labor,
environmentalists, public-interest lobbies, etc. But Delaware is
sparsely populated and hence resembles a relative vacuum in terms of
interest groups. It is interesting to note that Delaware shares this
characteristic with Nevada (the "Delaware of the West"), which also
has competed successfully for charters. The common denominator is
that both states can concentrate on marketing their corporate law to
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consumers because there is little inherent interest in the topic among
its citizens. In contrast, the labor unions have had a clear impact on
the New York Business Corporation Law, as evidenced by its unique
provision for large-shareholder liability for wages. 12 The ironic implications of this point are that if one truly believes that competition for
charters is desirable, the optimal solution would appear to be a fiftyfirst state without citizens, whose corporate law would be drafted, for
example, by the ABA's Corporate Laws Committee. Such a hypothetical jurisdiction could market a purely consumer-oriented body of
law, rather than one affected (or "distorted") by the preferences of its
citizens.
One advantage of this interest group explanation is that it can
explain some features of Delaware law that a pure tax revenue maximization story cannot. Initially, for example, it seems anomalous
that it is easier procedurally to sue the directors of a Delaware corporation in a derivative suit than those of corporations incorporated in
many other jurisdictions. This relative ease exists because Delaware
does not require a securities-for-expenses bond, because it permits
beneficial holders to bring suit, and because it has a very broad consent-to-service statute that makes it comparatively simple to obtain
jurisdiction over nonresident directors.B What explains this? These
legal rules do not appear to be motivated by a desire to maximize tax
revenues; rather, this prolitigation stance maximizes revenues for a
powerful interest group-lawyers. Similarly, Delaware law authorizes substantial fee awards for a plaintiff's attorneys under a more
liberal fee award statute than that used in federal courts, and Delaware has virtually institutionalized the nonpecuniary settlement
which permits the defendants in a derivative suit to enter into a collusive settlement with the plaintiff's attorneys. This, in effect, trades a
high fee award for a small to nonexistent recovery. Were Bill Cary
alive today, I suspect Polk v. Good, 14 a recent Delaware decision that
employs a much looser standard of settlement review than governs in
federal court and that permits high fees to be paid in return for largely
cosmetic relief, would make the updated version of his "dirty dozen"
12

See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law§ 630 (McKinney 1986).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (1986 Supp.); Pestolite, Inc. v. Cordura Corp., 449 A.2d
263, 265-66 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
14 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986). One recent survey of securities and derivative actions found
that in roughly 30% of the settlements analyzed, no monetary relief appeared to have been
received by the corporation. See Garth, Nagel, & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward A Better-Informed Debate, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137, 146
(Summer 1985). Presumably, in another significant proportion of the cases, the monetary relief received was less than, or approximately equal to, the fee awarded.
13
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list. Although Delaware's tolerance for collusive settlements may also
be in the interest of management, it is almost certainly not optimal
from the shareholders' perspective. Because the ability to pay bribery
to the plaintiff's attorney ultimately invites extortion, such judicial
benign neglect should encourage the filing of frivolous suits and an
excessive rate of litigation.
This view that the legal profession's self-interest shapes some of
the contours of Delaware law is subject to the obvious limitation that,
if the Delaware law were made unattractive to corporations, the corporate migration to Delaware will end. Thus, it is primarily the procedural law, not the substantive law, that lawyer self-interest appears
to have influenced most, probably because this body of law has lower
visibility to those making the choice of jurisdiction decision. Even if
corporate lawyers make this decision, they seldom understand all the
subtleties in this litigation area.
Ultimately, my point is a simple one. Forces are at work, even
within the relatively simple political context of Delaware, that are distinct from the desire to maximize the marketability of Delaware corporate law to the relevant consumer (whether that consumer is a
shareholder or manager). As a result, the shape of the law will be
more indeterminate than a simple revenue maximization model would
suggest. Most importantly, the Delaware bar, having a large fixed
investment in human capital, may be relatively risk-averse about the
prospect of federal intervention. Hence, it may resist opportunities to
maximize the attractiveness of its law to the consumer (whether that
consumer is the shareholder or the manager) if acceptance of such
opportunities might increase the prospect of federal intervention.
During the l 970's, this was a real prospect, and hence it becomes
understandable that a number of Delaware decisions took a more
proshareholder stance during this period.

B.

The Relevant Decisionmaker

If any major law firm in Manhattan is asked why it recommends
Delaware incorporation to its corporate clients, the answer will probably be the stability and the certainty of Delaware law and the expertise of its bench. This has long been the conventional wisdom, and it
differs from the neoclassical model which assumes that states compete
by developing legal innovations. The problem with this innovation
model is that it is hard to come up with a substantial list of Delaware
innovations that have more than housekeeping significance. Undeniably, however, Delaware does have more precedents, thereby giving
greater certainty, and its judges have more expertise and time to con-
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centrate on corporate law issues. Hence, it is not surprising that Delaware has a more attractive body of decisional law. The critical fact,
then, is Delaware's "first mover" advantage in the development of
precedents, which Professor Romano correctly mentions but to which
I would ascribe even greater weight. One cannot manufacture precedents, because they require both time and an existing supply of
litigants.
But here a paradox arises. It is now a commonplace observation
that Delaware's decisional law has become volatile and unpredictable
over the last decade. Important precedents, such as Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 15 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 16 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 17 Unocal, Inc. v. Mesa Petroleum, 18 and Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 19 have surprised most observers.
Why has Delaware law so recently become unstable if certainty
was its selling point? One answer involves Bill Cary's legacy. By raising the issue of Delaware's legal integrity, he may well have made
Delaware judges more sensitive, at least for a time, to issues of fairness. 20 A body of socio-psychological research suggests that the desire to be perceived as fair may significantly influence a judge's
behavior, even when that judge is biased in favor of one side. 21 This
does not mean that Delaware judges were necessaily unfair or biased
before Bill Cary wrote, but only that an increased desire to be perceived as fair can change our behavior.
More generally, economic models are on thin ice when they try
to predict judges' attitudes and preferences. With life tenure, or at
least the expectation of long-term employment, judges need not be as
sensitive or responsive to political attitudes and pressures as does the
legislature. While Delaware judges were socialized within the Dela380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
11 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
1s 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
19 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
20 Emphasizing this apparent reversal in direction and attributing it to the influence of the
Cary article, Professor Fischel has criticized these recent Delaware decisions as producing a
new "race to the bottom" that has reduced shareholders' wealth. See Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law,
76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913 (1982). For an effective empirical critique of his assertion that these
decisions have reduced shareholder wealth, see E. Weiss & L. White, Of Econometrics and
Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" In Corporate Law (available at
Cardozo Law Library).
21 Social scientists have developed a theory, known as "attribution theory," which finds
that legal decisionmakers are under strong "role pressures" to avoid any manifestation of bias.
See Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 386, 390-401 (1972).
15

16
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ware bar and thus probably shared its outlook, this generalization is
not an iron law. Most lawyers know of a defense lawyer who became
a "hanging judge" when appointed to the bench. As a result, to the
extent that the key element of Delaware law is its case law, there is
little reason to expect this body of law to be as stable as its statutory
law. This observation that judges are human and not always predictable will not excite the model builder, but it does suggest limits on his
craft and skill.
Historically, a factor that further explains this volatility is the
recent ebb and flow of pressure for federal fiduciary standards. Prior
to the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, 22 there was a realistic possibility that federal fiduciary standards would emerge from the circuit courts of appeals, especially the
Second Circuit. This factor may have influenced Delaware courts,
particularly in cases such as Singer. 23 As this prospect of federal judicial oversight fades, however, the case law could shift again in the
opposite direction-perhaps explaining in small part Singer's reversal
in Weinberger. 24 The volatility of Delaware's law is, in this view, the
product of the ebb and flow of the federal threat to Delaware's hegemony and, thus, to the human capital of its bar.
In evaluating Delaware's attractions, Professor Romano seems to
take it as a given that greater legal predictability is always a virtue. In
contrast, I view legal certainty as more problematic. Of course, certainty is usually beneficial, but it can sometimes be manipulated by
management in those areas where its interests conflict with those of
the shareholders. Good corporate lawyers can predict the response of
a Delaware court to a greenmail repurchase or to a leveraged buyout
by management at a low premium, and they can structure their transaction accordingly. It is doubtful, however, that they could be as confident of the response of a California court and, in particular, that
they could be as certain of the legal weight that would be given to
procedural measures, such as independent director approval or investment banker opinions. This ambiguous evaluation forces me next to
come to grips with Professor Romano's central argument: if Delaware law was unfavorable to shareholder interests, why wouldn't
stock price studies reveal this in the form of a negative reaction to
Delaware reincorporations?
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
2 4 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Still, a further change of direction back in the direction of
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) is discernible in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). This author agrees with the line drawn by Rabkin.
22
23
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The Stock-Price-Study Evidence

Professor Romano discounts the Cary thesis because, as she reviews the evidence, stock price studies of corporate migrations to Delaware do not show a decline in share value upon the announcement of
such a move. As she realizes, the problem with this evidence is that it
is potentially confounded by the market's anticipation of, or reaction
to, transactions it believes the bidder will undertake once it has migrated. If the market believes that the corporation is migrating to
Delaware in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with effectuating profitable mergers and acquisitions, then the value of the
firm's shares may rise in contemplation of such acquisitions, even
though shareholders might also believe that Delaware law gives them
less legal protection. Professor Romano acknowledges this problem,
but responds that in her research she was able to differentiate among
corporations "according to the reasons for which reincorporation was
undertaken." In the case of firms reincorporating to embark on acquisitions, there was a statistically significant positive stock market
reaction to the reincorporation; we may infer this to be a response to
the anticipation of profitable acquisitions. For other groups, however,
the market reaction was statistically insignificant (although still positive). This latter noisy signal might be interpreted to mean that because there was no decline in share value even when acquisitions were
not the motive for reincorporation, shareholders saw no injury from
an adoption of the legal regime offered by Delaware.
I do not see this as the logical inference to draw from statistical
noise. In my view, noise is the predictable market reaction, given the
significant informational asymmetry that exists between shareholders
and managers. At the moment of reincorporation, managers know
what their motive is, but shareholders typically do not. In general,
shareholders understand that corporate acts may signal future developments that have not been explicitly announced. Thus, stock dividends tend to elicit a positive market reaction, possibly on the
grounds that shareholders see them as a sign of future improved earnings or cash flow. But the interpretation of such management signals
involves much shareholder inference. When management decides to
reincorporate in Delaware, shareholders may read this as a signal of
favorable impending developments, even when none are in fact contemplated. Or, they may fear that management is contemplating
greenmail or a poison pill takeover defense, which Delaware law facilitates. Either way, they may overreact, and the result could be statistical noise if other shareholders view the reincorporation differently.
Two points here are central and distinguish my views from those of
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Professor Romano: First, we are dealing with a skewed sample because firms that do reincorporate have disproportionately experienced
high growth and earnings that have made them ambitious and acquisition oriented. Thus, I doubt we can compare two samples of corporations and state that the market reaction in one case, but not in the
other, is influenced by the anticipation of future transactions. Both
samples may be influenced by such shareholder inference, but to different degrees. Second, the magnitude of the shareholder reaction to
expected corporate developments-whether real or imagined,
whether favorable or adverse-should drown out any response to the
difference between legal regimes. This is because the discounted value
of the transaction cost savings that Delaware's more flexible legal regime offers is essentially trivial on a per share basis. Even the value of
its greater legal certainty must be discounted by the limited prospect
of litigation arising in the near future. In short, what counts is the
corporate motive, and noise results when it cannot be clearly
identified.
Other reasons are even more important to my belief that stock
price data can tell us little about the merits of competing legal regimes. First, it must be recognized that in the competition among
states, the race is always fairly close. Whether the race is to the top or
bottom (or sideways and more erratic, as I tend to believe), the competitors are seldom that far apart. Thus, we cannot measure Delaware's real impact by looking only to the margin at any given time
that separates it from its nearest rival, but rather we must consider the
total distance that this competition has taken us. Stock price studies
at best can only measure this margin, and cannot estimate the total
distance that this state competition took us from the legal regime that
would result absent such competition.
A second difficulty involves the earlier noted volatility of recent
Delaware precedents. I suspect that Bill Cary's legacy is most clearly
to be found here. Decisions like Singer may owe much to the heightened concern for fiduciary standards that his article helped arouse.
As a result, during the early 1980's, I heard some corporate lawyers
recommend against Delaware incorporation (in favor of Texas, incidentally) on the grounds that Delaware's judiciary was too "moralistic." Hence, any stock price study that uses this period for
comparison is confounded by the fact that during this period Delaware's decisional law appeared "tough," even if its statutory law was
"lax."
Another subtle problem with interjurisdictional comparisons involves the fact that Delaware's decisional law is automatically
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adopted by many other jurisdictions. Precedents in both Indiana and
Michigan, for example, hold that their highest courts will normally
follow the Delaware corporate law decisions. 25 In theory, automatic
adoption of the Delaware decisional law represents a means by which
other states can compete against Delaware's "first mover" advantage,
because it enables those states with little decisional law on corporate
issues to "bond" themselves to follow the mainstream and avoid novel
or erratic decisions (unless Delaware announces them first). In effect,
other jurisdictions can free ride on Delaware's substantial investment
in specialized courts and judicial expertise, thus leaving Delaware
with a comparative advantage only with respect to novel issues. This
pattern confounds the ability of a stock price study to measure Delaware's overall impact, because a new Delaware decision thus affects
the law of many states and through them the stock market as a whole.
Hence, no comparison is possible, because the whole universe of corporations is impacted.
D. Analogous Forms of Regulatory Competition
The basic economic model which sees different states or agencies
as producing different brands of regulation that consumers (i.e., corporations) choose among applies not only to corporate charter competition, but also to other forms of regulatory competition. Professor
Scott has used this model to examine the dual banking system in
which banks can elect to obtain (or switch between) either a federal or
state charter and thus be subject to different regulatory agencies. 26
Others have debated the significance of the current competition
among the stock exchanges, which recently resulted in the New York
Stock Exchange's abandonment of its longstanding one-share, onevote rule-an event that I do not see as benefiting shareholders. 27 In
these other fields, close observers, such as Professors Scott and Selig25 See Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Michigan courts will
normally follow Delaware law); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("Indiana takes its cues in matters of corporation law from the Delaware courts,
which are more experienced in such matters .... ").
26 Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 1 (1977).
27 See Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share,
One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687 (1986). A study by the SEC's chief economist has also found statistically significant negative changes in issuer's stock prices following
the announcement by an issuer of a proposal to issue dual-voting class stock that effectively
consolidated control with insiders. See Jarrell, The Stock Price Effects of NYSE Delisting for
Violating Corporate Governance Rules (available from Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission). Of course, some portion of this loss may have been attributable to the likely prospect of NYSE delisting for violation of its one-share, one-vote rule.
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man, have had doubts about whether this competition really followed
the same rules as the competition among private firms in a market.
Whether for good or ill, the general pattern has been that competition
among regulators reduces the agency's authority. The unique fact
about the corporate context is that some states are seeking to maximize their law's appeal to consumers (i.e., corporations), while others
are seeking to respond to powerful internal lobbies within the state.
For example, states within the Rust Belt have been the most aggressive in passing the new second generation of antitakeover laws to respond to powerful internal coalitions of local firms, unions, and their
satellite constituencies (including local law firms) that fear management ouster, plant closings, and the firm's physical departure from
the state. Professor Romano disagrees with this Rust Belt hypothesis
and cites statistical evidence and one case history to refute it. 28 Put
simply, I believe her methodology suffers from her disregard for the
"softer" social sciences. Historians, political scientists, and sociologists could add much to our understanding of these political dynamics, but for the time being I persist in seeing a particular distaste for
the hostile takeover in those Northeast and Midwestern states that are
losing population, experiencing high unemployment, and lack any significant population who are employed in merger and acquisition activities. Surely, it is more than coincidental that the current leader of the
antitakeover forces in the U.S. Senate is Senator Proxmire from
Wisconsin.
In any event, on the assumption that a state antitakeover statute
may be politically responsive to the local majority, it may still be
thought "unfair" to noncitizen shareholders who are thus denied lucrative takeover premiums. In principle, state competition could enable firms to escape this form of inefficient regulatory control-if
firms were willing to migrate to Delaware to escape restrictive antitakeover legislation. Unfortunately, I know of no unambiguous instances of migration away from sfatutes that excessively protected the
incumbent management. 29 If I am correct, this fact is like Sherlock
Holmes' dog that did not bark in the night; it suggests that the market
28 In her paper, Professor Romano assesses the Connecticut experience and finds that no
such coalition of labor and business formed to lobby for the Connecticut statute, which was
passed largely in response to the efforts of one corporation. Whatever the experience in Connecticut, the New York experience was emphatically different and fits the above described
Rust Belt pattern. Section 912 of the New York Business Corporation Law was a direct descendant of a more sweeping proposed statute that was strongly supported by both the AFLCIO and the New York State Business Council. The Governor's Counsel, Mr. Evan Davis, so
indicated at an ALI-ABA forum held in October, 1986.
29 Some state antitakeover statutes permit a corporation to "opt out" from their application, and some corporations have done so. However, the motive for such decisions appears to
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for charters is affected by a promanagerial bias. · In rebuttal, some
may point to Professor Romano's event study of second generation
takeover statutes which found no effect. Again, I have trouble with
what this study should be taken to demonstrate. Possibly, this is because such statutes may produce a wash: that is, higher premiums
result, but there are fewer bids. 30 If so, shareholders are not injured
as a class, although there may be wealth transfer effects within the
shareholder class as institutional investors lose their comparative advantage over smaller shareholders. Another more likely possibility
involves the high discount rates that rational individuals may apply to
remote or speculative events. Since relatively few of the incorporated
companies in any state will be actual takeover targets within the near
future (i.e., five years or so), shareholders may focus on the prospect
of a takeover only once there is distinct evidence that the company is
"in play."

II.

A

POLICY EVALUATION

State antitakeover legislation forces us to view Delaware in a new
light. Its decisional law, at least as expressed in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,31 strikes me as sound and sensible. Given the current empirical debate over whether defensive tactics enhance shareholder wealth (at least to the extent such tactics
promote an auction), Revlon's rule that the board's response must be
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed" 32 seems congruent with
the present state of our knowledge, because it authorizes an ex post
judicial inquiry that is unconstrained by the usual limitations of the
business judgment rule. Absent Delaware, the majority of today's
largest corporations might be subject to the kind of antitakeover regulation that Rust Belt legislatures would happily adopt. 33 Modem
"public choice" theory suggests that such forms of regulation are
often driven by covert interests and can be seriously adverse to the
shareholders' interests that they purport to protect.
have been that the statute, if applicable, would have seriously impeded the corporation's ability
to undertake acquisitions as an acquirer.
30 See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender- Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1181-83 (1984).
31 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
32 Id. at 180.
33 Of course, much of this legislation might be found invalid under the commerce clause.
But these issues remain to be resolved when the Supreme Court decides the CTS and Fleet
Aerospace cases. See supra note 5. It is no accident that these two cases involve statutes from
Ohio and Indiana, which are quintessential Rust Belt states. Minnesota and Wisconsin have
been equally hostile to takeovers. These states differ in their political complexion, but not in
their fears of migrating jobs and plant closings.
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Thus, a balanced evaluation of Delaware's position must consider the alternative: What would happen if Delaware did not exist?
Would we need to invent it? Absent charter competition, local state
interests might often (perhaps usually) produce an inefficient body of
corporate law. This conclusion leads me to a problematic assessment.
On the one hand, one may respond that charter competition weakens
state power and so has an antidemocratic effect. In this view, the real
problem with endorsing Professor Winter's market model is that it
seemingly deprives citizens of the ability to determine the legal regime
under which corporations in their jurisdiction shall operate. This result may be acceptable, however, if we believe corporate law has few
"third party" effects and essentially sets forth a model form contract
for use by shareholders. Although I do not fully subscribe to this
view, it suggests that shareholder welfare may suffer if a single state
can regulate the corporation when the corporation's interests and
span of activities transcend those of the state. The state may prefer its
local interests to those of the shareholders (as in the case of antitakeover legislation motivated by a desire to prevent plant closings or outof-state relocations). This is the opposite concern from the usual race
to the bottom thesis because it fears excessive state regulation in order
to favor local interests rather than excessive friendliness. Charter
competition reduces this former danger, even as it aggravates the
latter.
The bottom line is an uncertain trade-off. One can continue to
believe that Delaware may be excessively partial to management,
notwithstanding the stock-price-study evidence. Yet, one must recognize that local control by the state that has the primary contacts
(other than the fact of incorporation) may also be inefficient. Such a
trade-off compels us to consider the federal government's role.
Neither the tax revenue hypothesis nor the local capture theory apply
to it. Of course, it too could be excessively regulatory, but not because of any local imbalance of interests and lobbies.
The real problem with federal minimum standards is not that the
federal government is the wrong body to regulate, but that the optimal substantive content of such standards is very hard to determine.
Yet, if we do not know what is best, we may still know what is bad.
Bill Cary's idea of minimum standards did not necessarily freeze the
evolution of law, or prevent competition; rather, it simply put some
limits on that competition. From my perspective, the attraction of the
minimum standards approach is that it would apply equally to the
state that is aggressively seeking charters and the state aggressively
seeking to protect local industries, both of which may have "manage-
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rialist" biases. From this perspective, the operative policy question
becomes: What is the least restrictive "minimum" standard that can
prevent externalities without unduly intruding on the values of federalism or authorizing excess federal regulation? To explain my answer
to this question, some background is useful.
At the outset of this paper, I noted that although federal legislation was unthinkable in the current climate, something that much resembled federal minimum standards seemed to be overtaking the
market for corporate control. Personally, although I would applaud
the SEC for adopting rules 14d-10 and 13c-4, I believe that the logical
consequence of Judge Posner's statements in CTS 34 is not competition, but anarchy. Arguably, Judge Posner's test might wholly preclude state competition in the field of takeover regulation. This
problem is aggravated by the fact that in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 35 the Supreme Court largely drained federal law of
any substantive content. 36 Thus, we face the paradox of the Supreme
Court refusing to extend federal law in deference to the states in
Schreiber, while lower federal courts invalidate state regulatory efforts
under the commerce clause in deference to the federal government's
exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce. The net result is a
vacuum.
What should be the standard? Professor Romano makes the intriguing compromise suggestion that state takeover regulation should
contain an "opt-in" provision so that it would apply only if adopted
by shareholders. This answer is on the right track, but stops well
short of the optimal solution. Opt-in provisions still limit the range of
shareholder choice and typically require board approval. Indeed, the
commerce clause could be read to mandate an answer not significantly different than her suggestion. On the theory that a state law
which burdens interstate commerce is presumptively invalid if less restrictive alternatives are available for achieving the same legitimate
goals of regulation, the commerce clause could be interpreted to invalidate state statutes regulating takeovers that do not permit opting in
or out. 37 What less restrictive alternative is available? The simplest
794 F.2d at 264. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
472 U.S. 1 (1985).
36 In Schreiber, the Court held that the Williams Act is a disclosure statute, which does not
authorize the substantive regulation of tender offers, except as expressly provided. Specifically,
it found that the term "manipulative" as used in§ 14(e) of the Williams Act did not authorize
a court to enjoin conduct that frustrated a tender offer, ifit was fully disclosed. 472 U.S. at 1112.
37 Commerce clause analysis has frequently looked to the availability of less restrictive
alternatives and has basically sought to balance the benefits of regulations having a valid local
purpose against their burden on interstate commerce. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
34

35
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answer is that the state could instead have adopted enabling legislation that would not be mandatory but under which shareholders
could approve charter provisions blocking or chilling takeovers. 38
Action taken by shareholders pursuant to enabling legislation is private action which neither offends the commerce clause nor is preempted by the Williams Act. 39 In contrast, mandatory legislation
sweeps too broadly because no showing has been made to explain why
shareholders will not adopt a beneficial provision voluntarily if it is
presented by management. While opt-in statutes would, of course, be
permissible under this interpretation, they are not optimal because
they constrain the range of shareholder choice to "yes" or "no."
Another approach has been suggested recently by the SEC in its
Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control
("Concept Release"). 40 In this Release, the SEC seeks comments on
whether it should authorize "self-governance exemptions to specific
tender offer rules." 41 For example, a charter amendment might waive
the Commission's all holders rule that requires a tender offer to be
made to all shareholders in a class. 42 Or, such a "self-governance exemption" might adopt specific takeover rules such as the Bebchuk
proposal to require shareholder approval of a hostile takeover. 43 This
proposal also entails a problematic evaluation because of the tendency
for state takeover regulation to be protarget and antibidder.
What conditions should be placed upon this power to adopt
"self-governance exemptions"? Many could be sensibly proposede.g., sunset provisions, supermajorities, appraisal remedies, shareholder initiatives to make counterproposals44-but possibly the most
340 U.S. 349 (1951). See also G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 276-78 (11th ed. 1985) (distinguishing between discriminatory "effect" and "purpose" when the statute is not discriminatory
on its face).
38 A few states, most notably New York, permit direct shareholder amendment of the
Certificate oflncorporation. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law§ 803(a) (McKinney 1986). This provision seems preferable to an opt-in provision since it outflanks a managerial veto at the board
level and gives shareholders a freer range of choice.
39 For cases holding that private action taken pursuant to enabling state authority is not
state action, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-05 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-77 (1972).
40 Exchange Act Release No. 34-23486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096 (August 5, 1986).
4t Id. at 28,097.
4 2 See Rule 14d-10, 51 Fed. Reg. 25873 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10
(applicable to third-party offers) and Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986) (applicable to
self-tenders by an issuer). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
43 See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1747-49 (1985).
44 With regard to the desirability of such protections, see American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Advisory Group Draft No. 7,
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important condition should be one that generalizes this ability to
adopt exemptions and extends it to state antitakeover regulation as
well. Shareholders should not face a restricted agenda in their ability
to opt out. Put simply, the Williams Act chiefly regulates and protects the bidder from more restrictive state legislation or decisional
law. By setting time limits, the Williams Act precludes dilatory or
burdensome state regulation. The best example of the protective shelter afforded the bidder is the SEC's all holders rule, which now protects the bidder from a discriminatory self-tender by the target that
excludes the bidder. 45 If the target is permitted to opt out from the all
holders rule (or any similar provision), basic considerations of equity
and evenhandedness suggest that there should be an equivalent right
to opt out from state statutes that, for example, require a vote before a
"controlling share acquisition" or trigger a right to redemption once a
specified threshold is crossed. In short, if shareholders are to be asked
to determine their own legal regime, they should be enfranchised to
relax not only the regulations that bind the target's hands but also
those that bind the bidder's. Opting out from federal legal rules is a
particularly risky concept to legitimatize, 46 but, if it is to be done, the
target's management should not be able to select the legal rules to be
waived. Instead, shareholders should be permitted to use the proxy
system to make counterproposals to opt out of state rules. To be sure,
many state statutes do not permit shareholders to opt out, but in these
cases waiver of the federal rules should be prohibited. Over the long
run, this reciprocal policy may encourage states to permit greater opting out.
To sum up, two routes to enhanced and meaningful shareholder
choice are open: SEC action and constitutional decision under the
commerce clause. The traditional criteria used in commerce clause
analysis-namely, the less restrictive alternative test-should not stop
at the edge of the "internal affairs" rule, but should be applied so as to
place a heavy burden on a state seeking to justify mandatory, rather
than enabling, legislation to protect shareholders. 47
§§ 6.01-6.04 (September 17, 1986) (proposing some such protections, including in some cases
sunset provisions and appraisal remedy). The author has served as one of the Reporters to this
Project.
4 5 See Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986); see supra note 2.
4 6 In particular, shareholders cannot estimate accurately how management will utilize a
provision authorizing discrimination within a class. It may be that a provision intended to
authorize a selective self-tender or poison pill could be used instead to favor institutional investors over small shareholders. For example, management might decide to buy out arbitrageurs
and institutional investors holding its stock (and not smaller investors) pursuant to a selftender in order to take the firm "out of play."
47 I have suggested at greater length that private action undertaken by shareholders pursu-
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Still, it is speculative to predict that the commerce clause will be
stretched this far. Indeed, it is even possible (although unlikely) that
the Supreme Court might reverse the Seventh Circuit in Dynamics
Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp. 48 on the grounds that Santa Fe permits
a state to regulate internal corporate governance (even if in so doing it
chills the market for corporate control). In this event, a host of statutes similar to the Indiana and Ohio statutes seem foreseeable. Moreover, there would be little prospect of federal legislation overruling
such state legislation. What I would suggest at this juncture would be
a new kind offederal minimum standard: namely, a federally guaranteed right of shareholder initiative. Because it is unlikely that all
states would enact similar antitakeover legislation and because, as
Professor Romano argues, Delaware is among the states least likely to
enact strongly protectionist antitakeover legislation, the most important federal minimum standard may be an effective shareholder right
to exit a particular state regulatory regime. That is, if shareholders
had an effective right to reincorporate their corporation in another
jurisdiction by direct shareholder initiative, they could escape protectionist state statutes and rely on the "market for charters" to provide
them with at least some safe havens to which they could flee. Thus,
they could escape the managerial veto that today inheres in the fact
that in most jurisdictions all mergers and charter amendments first
must be proposed by the board. Designing an effective right to "exit"
for the corporation is no small problem, given the inherent difficulties
in collective shareholder action. But in a marketplace increasingly
dominated by institutional investors, it is not unthinkable. 49 In principle, a federally-created right to exit would be a federal minimum
standard of a kind Bill Cary did not foresee-one that protects shareholders by activating, not restricting, the market for charters. Ironically, my proposal implements Ralph Winter's view of the market for
charters by using Bill Cary's technique for implementation. Ultimately, a federal right guaranteeing shareholder choice among state
legal regimes is a minimalist safeguard that protects the interstate
ant to a charter (which might be specifically authorized by an enabling statute) should offend
neither the commerce clause nor be preempted by the Williams Act. See Coffee, supra note 11,
at 93-103.
48 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-71).
49 Any federally created right to change the jurisdiction of incorporation by shareholder
initiative would not necessarily overrule shareholder-approved shark repellents, which might
still require a supermajority before the firm could reincorporate elsewhere. Alternatively,
there could be a "sunset review" at regular intervals (say, every five years) so that a
supermajority requirement adopted in one era would not forever block reincorporation if the
applicable state law subsequently changed. I do no more here than sketch the barest outlines
of such a proposal.
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market for charters and, may make it meaningful. Such a reform is
not a panacea, but its impact could become significant in future years
if the trend toward greater activism on the part of institutional shareholders continues.
This conference is about the future of corporate law. The SEC
Release and the CTS decision do indeed hint at the dawn of a new
era-a brave new world of "roll your own" law regimes. But if we are
to enter this new world, the guiding principle that I would offer is that
shareholder choice should not be constrained by the existence of managerial control over the shareholders' agenda. Shareholders should be
given equivalent autonomy to repeal or revise the legal rules applicable to both sides in corporate control contests because it is a false
deference to the ideal of shareholder autonomy to allow them to
waive only the federal regulatory structure or only those provisions
that managers ask them to waive. Similarly, my suggestion that
shareholders should be accorded a direct shareholder initiative to
reincorporate in another jurisdiction represents, I believe, a new
way-one that does not intrude on the values of federalism-to implement some aspects of Bill Cary's idea of minimum standards. Bill
Cary's legacy is still with us.

